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Abstract 
This study aims to examine the determinants of multiple foreign listing decision. By implementing a multiple event-time 
experiment, we find no evidence to support the bonding hypothesis. Firms from developed countries prefer to list in proximate 
additional foreign markets (in geographic terms) to overcome market segmentation, and to benefit from better informational 
environment. The decision of multiple listing may be also related to the global business strategy of the firm. Firms from 
emerging countries, especially those with high quality, list in additional foreign market in order to overcome investment barriers. 
While liquidity and informational considerations play little role, culture proximity is a determining factor in the decision of 
multiple foreign listing for firms from emerging countries.  
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the 1980, the world’s capital markets have been hugely influenced by globalization. The growth in 
international integration among world capital markets was mainly explained by the decision made by corporations to 
consider cross listing as a means of overcoming investments barriers and making a firm’s shares accessible to 
foreign investors. In more recent years, the increased integration was supposed to reduce the need for firms to cross 
list; however, this was not the case and the phenomenon of cross listing remained important. Interestingly, a 
considerable body of academic literature has so far examined the benefits of cross listing to understand the 
motivations of listing abroad. These motivations was related to different considerations related essentially to market 
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segmentation (Abdallah and Ioannidis, 2010; Miller, 1999; Sarkissian and Schill, 2009; You et al. 2013), to 
information environment(Amira and Muzere, 2011; Bailey et al. 2006; Lang et al. 2003; Lee and Valero, 2010), to 
liquidity (Abdallah et al. 2011; Domowitz et al.1998; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998; Silva and Chavez, 2008) and to 
the legal environment of the firm (Doidge, 2004; Doidge et al. 2007; Doidge et al. 2009; Reese and Weisbach, 2002; 
You et al. 2013).However, greater heterogeneity was recorded in the results of earlier empirical studies cited 
previously. And so, great ambiguities stills reign about the real motivations of cross listing. This greater 
heterogeneity is mainly explained by some limits associated with the methodologies used by earlier studies. On the 
one hand, the majority of earlier studies focus essentially on the economic consequences of cross listing around the 
date of listing abroad. Certainly, this literature does not analyze direct motivations of cross listing. Karolyi (2006) 
asserts that an important research opportunity would be to devise tests that reliably disassociate the motives for 
listing from the capital market consequences of the event of interest. On the other hand, the majority of earlier 
studies do not consider a full matrix of the factors explaining the decision to cross list. As pointed out by Karolyi 
(2006), cross listing is a complex decision that cannot be analyzed based strictly on a limited number of factors.  
In addition to the methodological limits cited above, we are motivated by other raison to re-examine the 
motivations of cross listing. First, we are interesting to the important and continuing developments that have taken 
place in financial markets around the world in the last decade. These developments are related essentially to the 
adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 which has probably affected the cost of cross listing in the U.S., the 
introduction of new types of markets and trading platforms that are generally different from traditional regulated 
markets in their listing requirements. These developments may significantly affect the motivations for listing abroad. 
However, understanding the motivations of cross listing in different markets around the world and how these 
motivations may change over time remain an open question. Second, despite the fact that a significant number of 
stocks are listed in multiple foreign markets, current understanding of this phenomenon is very limited.  
The purpose of this study is to remedy to the limits cited above by creating a new analytical framework 
associated, not only to the new context of multiple foreign listing, but also to limits detected from the methodologies 
used by earlier literature. In this paper, we try to further enrich the literature on cross-listing and to produce a greater 
understanding of the multiple listing phenomenon by studying the determinants of additional foreign listing 
decision. Our paper is, in our knowledge, the first study that analyzes direct motivations of the decision of additional 
foreign listings, and their evolution in time. Our new analytical framework allow us to propose and to implement 
multiple event-time experiment by using multiple failure time model which measures the probability of the 
recurrence of the cross listing event.  
We aim to add to the new literature on multiple foreign listing by providing new evidence using a unique and 
comprehensive sample of 333 firms from 33 countries with 915 foreign listing in 19 countries over the period 1980-
2013.Our main results are as follow. We find that, for firms from developed markets, those with better quality and 
faster growth choose to cross list in nearby foreign markets (in geographic term) to overcome market segmentation, 
to raise capital at lower cost and to benefit from better liquidity. Firms may also prefer to list in additional foreign 
markets with higher disclosure standards and where they have a subsidiary. For the subset of firms from emerging 
economies, those with better quality prefer to list in additional foreign markets to overcome investment barriers. We 
also find that culture proximity plays a significant role in the decision of multiple foreign listing. Additionally, our 
results do not provide evidence supporting the bonding hypothesis. The country’s level of investor protection plays 
next to no role in the decision of multiple foreign listing both for firms from emerging and developed countries. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on cross-listing and develops testable 
hypotheses on the determinants of multiple foreign listing. Section 3 explains the methodology and section 4 
describes the sample and data collection. Section 5presents the empirical findings and section 6concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development: 
 
In this section, we review the literature related to cross-listing and set our hypothesis as regards to the motivation 
for listing in multiple foreign markets. 
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2.1. Market Segmentation Hypothesis 
 
The most extensively examined reason for cross-listing is the segmentation hypothesis. Undeniably, firms make a 
decision to list their shares abroad in order to overcome market segmentation. The theoretical models by Alexander 
et al.(1987), Errunza and Losq (1985)and Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977) suggest that, under partial or 
complete segmentation, domestic investors require a higher rate of returns on foreign security compared to their 
home securities. By making a decision to cross list, firms can overcome international investment barriers and make 
their stocks more accessible to investors. In turn, improved stock investability increases the shareholders base and 
risk sharing, thereby leading to a lower cost of capital. Earlier studies report a significant reduction in the cost of 
capital after cross listing, supporting market segmentation hypothesis (Errunza and Miller, 2000; Foerster and 
Karolyi, 1999; Hail and Leuz, 2009; Jayaraman et al. 1993). Some other studies examine the change in stock price 
around cross listing and provide empirical evidence that is congruent with the segmentation hypothesis (Doukasand 
Switzer, 2000; Miller, 1999; Mittoo, 2003).Based on this literature, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Firms seek additional foreign listing to overcome market segmentation. 
 
Bekaert et al. (2011) report a reduction in the level of segmentation among international capital market for the 
period 1973-2009. However, this level of segmentation is still important in emerging markets.  Miller (1999) and 
Serra (1999) show that firms from emerging market benefit more from cross listing. Based on this literature and 
given the fact that investment barriers are more important in emerging markets, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1’: Firms, especially those from emerging countries, seek additional foreign listing to overcome market 
segmentation. 
 
2.2. Liquidity Hypothesis 
 
Cross-listings on deeper and more liquid equity markets could lead to an increase in the liquidity of the stock and 
a decrease in the cost of capital (Roosenboom and Van Dijk, 2009). The theoretical models developed by Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) suggest that greater liquidity can translate into a 
lower cost of capital for the company concerned insofar as it is valued by investors and factored into market prices. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) suggest that stock liquidity is an important factor in pricing assets and show that 
expected asset returns is an increasing and concave function of the bid-ask spread. Thus, financial policies that 
improve stock liquidity, such as cross-listing, should translate into a lower cost of equity capital (Dodd, 2013). 
Accordingly, enhancing liquidity is considered one of the major benefits of cross listing. Earlier empirical works 
show that cross listing improve stock liquidity in terms of increased trading volume (Smith and Sofianos, 1997; 
Foerster and Karolyi, 1998) and reduced bid- ask spread (Domowitz et al. 1998; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998). 
However, there is cross sectional variation across firms. In general, several studies report an improvement in stock 
liquidity after cross listing for firms from developed country, and no significant improvement or even deterioration 
in stock liquidity for firms from emerging markets (Bacidore et al. 2005; Domowitz et al. 1998; Silva and Chavez, 
2008; Smith and Sofianos, 1997).Based on these arguments, we draw up the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Firms seek additional foreign listing to benefit from better liquidity. 
 
H2’: Market’s liquidity is not crucial for the decision of multiple foreign listing for firms from emerging countries. 
 
 
2.3. Information Disclosure Hypothesis 
 
Listing in a country with better accounting standards allows the company to commit itself to greater transparency, 
and thereby reducing the monitoring costs of its shareholders and their required rate of returns. Fuerst (1998) 
developed a theoretical model to explain the increasing number of listing by foreign firms on American exchanges 
in 1990 and show that corporate managers make a decision to cross list in a country with better disclosure standards 
666   Imen Ghadhab and Slaheddine Hellara /  Procedia Economics and Finance  26 ( 2015 )  663 – 681 
to disseminate more information about the firm’s future prospects and quality. In addition, theoretical models of 
Amira and Muzere (2011), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) and Huddart et al.(1999) suggest that firms choose to 
cross list on the exchange with the strictest disclosure requirement to benefit more from cross listing in terms of cost 
of capital and liquidity. Empirically, Lang et al.(2003) and Lee and Valero (2010) show that cross listing in the US 
is associated with an enhanced informational environment. Finally, greater information disclosure after cross listing 
leads to higher market valuation and improved stock’s liquidity (Abdallah et al. 2011; Amira and Muzere, 
2011;Bailey et al. 2006; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2006; Eaton et al. 2007; Fuerst, 1998; Lang et al. 2003;Lang et 
al. 2012; Roosenboom and Van Dijk, 2009).Based on these theoretical and empirical arguments, we formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Firms seek additional foreign listing to benefit from better informational environment. 
 
Lee and Valero (2010) show that improvement in information environment after cross listing in the US is more 
intense among foreign firms originating from emerging markets. Roosenboom and VanDijk (2009) report that 
emerging markets are characterized by lower accounting standards. Based on these arguments, we put together the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3’: Firms, especially those from emerging country, seek additional foreign listing to benefit from better 
informational environment. 
 
2.4. Investor Protection Hypothesis 
 
Another raison for cross listing is the commitment to higher standards of investor protection in order to protect 
minority shareholders. This is known as the bonding hypothesis originally put forward by Coffee (1999, 2002) and 
Stulz (1999) and empirically supported by Doidge (2004), Doidge et al. (2007) and Reese and Weisbach (2002), 
who show that cross listing in the US enhances the degree of investor protection. The hypothesis suggests that the 
private benefit of control increases the risk to outsiders (i.e. minority investors) and subsequently the required return 
on the firm’s equity. This prevents the insiders (the controlling shareholders/ managers) from raising the required 
capital and limits their ability to finance future growth opportunities. The insiders will decide to cross list on foreign 
exchange with higher investor protection regulations if the size of the increase in the public value of shares is 
relatively larger than the fall in the private benefit. This lowers the risk of expropriation by the insiders and increases 
the public value of the firm’s shares, which enables the firms to issue equity at a lower cost of capital (Abdallah and 
Ioannidis, 2010).Previous empirical evidence by LaPorta et al.(1997, 1998) shows that the US has the highest level 
of investor protection compared with other countries. Bonding may also play a role for non-US exchanges- although 
to a lesser extent- and issuers can potentially capture a bonding premium when they list in any destination market 
with stricter legal investor protection than their home country (Roosenboom and VanDijk, 2009).To test the bonding 
hypothesis, we put forward the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: Firms seek additional foreign listing to benefit from better legal environment in term of investor protection. 
 
Given that emerging markets are characterized by a weak investor protection (Roosenboom and VanDijk, 2009), we 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H4’:  Firms, especially those from emerging country, seek additional foreign listing to benefit from better legal 
environment in term of investor protection. 
 
 
2.5. Proximity Preference Hypothesis 
 
Preference proximity hypothesis implies that geography determine the decision to cross list. Sarkissian and Shill 
(2004) find that companies going abroad tend to prefer to list in neighboring markets. For example, firms from the 
Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) tend to cross list in Benelux country, Canadian and 
Latin American firms in the US, Irish firms in the UK, and New Zealand firms list heavily in Australia and vice 
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versa. Such clustering in the choice of destination markets indicates a preference for familiarity in cross listing 
decision (Sarkissian and Shill, 2004), and cannot be explained in terms of liquidity, disclosure, segmentation or legal 
bonding hypothesis. On a similar line, Dodd (2013) reports that familiarity with the cross listing firm, or with the 
firm’s country, provides an information advantage to investors and, therefore, increases their willingness to invest. 
Firms anticipate this and will choose to cross list in foreign markets where investors have a significant amount of 
relevant information about them. Similarly, Dodd et al. (2013) outline that, as investors are more likely to invest in 
familiar firms and corporate managers tend to avoid possible conflict with culturally disparate investors and 
managers, firms are more likely to cross list in country similar to their home one in order to maximize the benefits 
from cross listing in terms of increase in shareholders base. Empirically, Sarkissian and Shill(2004) show that 
geographic proximity is the most important determinant of the decision to cross list for firms originating from 
developed countries as well as those from emerging countries. Dodd et al.(2013) and Sarkissian and Shill (2004) 
show that culture plays a significant role in the cross listing decision. Firms are more likely to cross list in countries 
where cultural values are similar to their home market. Based on these arguments, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H5a: Firms seek additional foreign listing in geographic proximate market. 
 
H5b: Firms seek additional foreign listing in culture proximate market. 
 
2.6. Business Strategy Hypothesis 
 
Earlier studies have shown that cross listing is an integrated part of the firm’s global business strategy. Firms may 
seek to cross-list in foreign markets for a variety of reasons related to the firm’s corporate strategy: signal to market 
participants that the company has become a global player, provide better access to customers and suppliers, make 
mergers and acquisitions activities in foreign markets (Bancel and Mittoo, 2001; Fanto and Karmel, 1997; Pagano et 
al. 2002). Firms can benefit from cross listing if they succeed in their global strategy. According to the business 
strategy hypothesis, the decision to cross list is related to the firm’s specific factors such as industrial belonging 
which represent an important determinant of the cross listing decision (Bancel and Mittoo, 2001; Fanto and Karmel, 
1997; Dodd and Luca, 2012;Doidge et al. 2009; Mittoo, 2003; Pagano et al. 2001, 2002; Sarkissian and Shill, 
2004).Since investors are likely to be familiar with firms that produce internationally traded goods (Sarkissian and 
Shill, 2004), we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H6a: firms that produce internationally traded goods are more likely to seek additional foreign listing. 
 
Based on a questionnaire sent to the corporate managers, Bancel and Mittoo (2001) find that internationally-oriented 
firms with a significant degree of foreign operations are more likely to cross list. Over 70% of the respondents have 
more than half of their sales in foreign countries; almost all respondents (96%) have foreign subsidiaries, and 84% 
have manufacturing operations in foreign countries (Bancel and Mittoo, 2001).Based on these arguments, we 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H6b: firms with foreign subsidiaries are more likely to list in additional foreign market. 
 
2.7. Growth Opportunities and Capital Rising 
 
One of the most cited reasons for cross listing is that the firm needs more equity capital for new investment 
because it is fast growing (Pagano et al. 2002; You et al. 2013).Doidge et al.(2007), Lins et al.(2005), Mittoo (2003) 
and Reese and Weisbach (2002) report that the presence of a substantial proportion of firms cross listed in the US is 
due to their capacity to finance their growth opportunities. Such firms should have a higher price-to-earnings ratio. 
Thus, we set the following hypothesis: 
 
H7: firms with high price-to-earnings ratio are more likely to cross list in additional foreign market. 
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3. Methodology 
 
We analyze the determinants of multiple foreign listing decisions using a model that extends the standard Cox 
(1972) proportional hazard model developed for single event data to multiple event data. 
 
The standard Cox (1972) proportional hazard model can be presented as follow: 
 
)1(.0));('exp()()( 0 t ttZtYtY E  
 
Where: 
 
x :)(tY The hazard rate, which is the probability of listing at time t conditional on not having listed yet. 
x :)(0 tY The baseline hazard function assumed to be equal for every failure type. 
x :E A parameters regression’s vector that measure the effect of the determinant jZ  on the decision to cross 
list. 
Under the Cox (1972) model, the assumption of proportional hazard implies that the hazard of any firm is a fixed 
proportion of the hazard of any other firm. Earlier studies, such as Pagano et al.(2002), use the standard Cox (1972) 
proportional hazard model to analyze the determining factors of a decision to cross list but they do not consider 
multiple foreign listing, i.e. after a firm lists abroad on one market, it is excluded from the model estimation because 
it is no longer at risk of listing. However, Doidge et al.(2009) uses a competing risk model where listing choice 
includes both US and the UK. Since the objective of our work is to analyze the determinants of multiple foreign 
listing, we propose to use a multiple failure time model as an extension of the single event Cox (1972) proportional 
hazard model. Under multiple failure time models, with multiple foreign listing, a cross listed firm is still at risk of 
listing in additional foreign market. The case we analyze is sometimes referred to as “ordered failure event”, and the 
model we estimate is the Prentice, Williams and Peterson conditional gap time model, (Prentice, Williams and 
Peterson, 1981, model; PWP model).The PWP model requires the same assumption as the standard Cox 
proportional hazard model but allows the baseline hazard to vary from recurrence to recurrence, and therefore adjust 
for the fact that the current event may have been affected by earlier events. 
 
The hazard function for the listing event k in a PWP model is as follows: 
 
)2(0));('exp()()( 10 t  ttZttYtY kkkkk E  
 
Since the PWP model defines the risk set for the thk recurrence ( thk foreign listing event) as any firm who had not 
yet experienced the thk recurrence and does necessarily have had the thk )1(  recurrence, it is therefore suitable for 
our analysis (See Lim et al.(2007) for further details on multiple failure time models).To estimate the model, we 
follow the procedure outlined in Cleves (1999). For each firm, there must be one observation per event of foreign 
listing. For example, if a firm has two events, then, there will be two observations. The first observation will cover 
the time span from entry into the study until the time of the event of foreign listing, and the second observation 
spans the time from entry to the end of follow up, and a variable indicating the failure order is included. The 
conditional gap model measures time to each event from the time of the previous event (Cleves, 1999). 
 
4. Sample and data collection: 
 
Our initial sample consists of 1135 firms with foreign listing in US markets (including AMEX, NASDAQ, NYSE 
and OTC), European markets (including LSE, Deutsche Boerse (including Frankfort stock exchange and XETRA), 
Euronext Paris, Euronext Amsterdam, Euronext Brussels, Swiss stock exchange, Madrid stock exchange, Milan 
stock exchange, Stockholm stock exchange, and the Irish stock exchange), Toronto stock exchange, Tokyo stock 
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exchange, Australian stock exchange, New Zealand stock exchange and Johannesburg stock exchange, over the 
period from 1980 to 2013. Information on cross listed firms is from stock exchanges websites. Data on ADRs are 
from the bank of New York and J.P Morgan ADRs databases. The sample is also supplemented with information on 
foreign listing from Datastream. We include both active and inactive stocks. Thus, this dataset is unlikely to suffer 
from survivorship bias. Our analysis includes both direct and ADRs listing.We remove 350 cross-listings from the 
sample for which we could not find an identifiable listing date for a cross-listing. Based on this sample, and 
following You et al (2013), we use the listing date as the cross listing event date. Then, we eliminate preference 
stocks listing as well as Rule 144 from the analysis; this requirement excludes another 89 cross-listings from our 
sample.Next, the firm-level and country-level explanatory variables we use to test our hypothesis are collected from 
various sources. Returns correlation indices, market liquidity, market capitalization, Price-to-Earnings ratio and 
Return-On-Assets are from Datastream and Worldscope. Information about firm’s subsidiaries is available on 
fr.transnationale.org. Legal variables (Investor protection index and Rule of Law) are from LaPorta et al.(1998) and 
Djankov et al.(2008), and accounting standard index is from LaPorta et al.(1998).Firms with no available data are 
omitted. This reduces the number of cross listed firms and the final sample consists of 333 firms from 33 countries 
with 915 foreign listing. Table 1 present the frequency distribution of the cross listing event by host and home 
countries and by the period of time. And table 2 provides information about the number of foreign listings by home 
countries. This paper represents international perspectives as it is based on the experience of companies from 
various countries that are cross listed in various international stock markets. The sample is also significant in that it 
represents stocks listed, directory or via ADRs, in multiple foreign markets.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1. Multiple Foreign Listing: Data Description: 
 
5.1.1: Sample Description: 
 
Table 1 presents the distribution of cross listing by home and foreign listing countries and by period of time. The 
US is the largest host market for cross listing firms that constitute 28.74% of the sample. The three largest European 
host markets are Germany (20.33%), the UK (18.9%), and Switzerland (12.24%). The most important countries in 
terms of the number of cross listing firms are France (13%), the UK (8.63%), Germany (8.63%) and US (6.45%).  
Table1 shows some evidence that companies choose to cross list in country with geographic proximity. For 
example, European firms list heavily in European countries; Australia attracts more firms from New Zealand; while 
Canadian firms list mostly in the US. Out of 50 Irish listings abroad, 25 are in the UK. Table 1 also shows that the 
1990s and the 2000s are the most important periods with respectively 33.7% and 56.3% of the total cross listing 
events. We observe that Europe was the most important host market for overseas listing up until 1990.  
In the 1990s and 2000s, the cross listing event within Europe and the US had an upward trend. It is still 
significant in Europe and has become more important in the US, especially inthe 2000s.Table 2 describes the 
multiple foreign listing in the sample. There are 87, 75, 90, 38, 17, 15, 7 and 4 firms which respectively cross-listed 
in one, two, three, four, five, six, seven and eight foreign markets. Firms from developed markets are more likely to 
list in multiple foreign markets, especially for the high order of foreign listing. These firms are essentially from 
Europe. 
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Table 1 
 
This table provides sample distribution by host and home country and period of time. Home country is the country of domicile of the cross listing company. Host 
country is the cross- listing destination country. The total sample consists of 915 cross listing events. 
  Host country 
  Australia Belgium Canada France Germany Ireland Italia Japan Netherlands 
New 
Zealand 
South 
Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland UK US Total 
% of 
Total 
Home 
country 
Argentina                     1     1 7 9 0.98 
Australia       5     2   3 2       11 15 38 4.15 
Austria       5                 2 2 5 14 1.53 
Belgium     1 9       2         3 2 6 23 2.51 
Brazil       1             3   1   6 11 1.20 
Canada 2     1 15                 3 8 19 48 5.25 
Chile                     2       3 5 0.55 
China 2       1                   9 7 19 2.08 
Denmark       3                 3 2 4 12 1.31 
Finland     1 1   1   1           2 1 7 0.77 
France 3     21   13 3 8         23 22 26 119 13 
Germany 4   5     11 4 7     3   20 15 10 79 8.63 
Greece                         2 1 3 6 0.66 
India                           3 3 6 0.66 
Indonesia       1                   1 1 3 0.33 
Ireland       11                 3 25 11 50 5.46 
Italia     3 7       2     1   4 4 10 31 3.39 
Japan     5 13       3         1 9 16 47 5.14 
Luxembourg 2     3       2     2   2 3 5 19 2.08 
Mexico       1                     1 2 0.22 
Netherlands 2 1 2 10   4 1           8 5 10 43 4.70 
New 
Zealand 10       2                   1 12 25 2.73 
Norway       3               3 1   3 10 1.09 
Singapore       1                     4 5 0.55 
South Africa 2     2 3                 1 6 8 22 2.4 
South Korea             1             4 4 9 0.98 
Spain     1 8   2 1 4         5 6 11 38 4.15 
Sweden   1   7                 1 4 7 20 2.19 
Switzerland     2 15     1         1   10 17 46 5.03 
Taiwan       3                   3 3 9 0.98 
Turkey                           1 1 2 0.22 
UK 1 1 7 22 1   1 3   1     18   24 79 8.63 
US 2 2   5 15     5 5       1 11 13   59 6.45 
Total 18 14 3 35 186 1 31 19 37 3 3 12 5 112 173 263 915 100 
Period of 
time                                   
1980-1989 0 7 0 20 26 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 18 17 92 10 
1990-1999 8 4 2 9 76 0 4 16 21 2 3 4 1 34 58 66 308 33.7 
2000-2013 10 3 1 6 84 0 27 3 14 1 0 8 4 77 97 180 515 56.3 
Total 18 14 3 35 186 1 31 19 37 3 3 12 5 112 173 263 915 100 
% of Total 1.97 1.53 0.33 3.83 20.33 0.11 3.39 2.08 4.04 0.33 0.33 1.31 0.55 12.24 18.9 28.74 100   
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Table 2 
 
This table provides the number of stocks listed in 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 foreign markets. For example, there are 12 Canadian firms 
listed in one foreign market, 13 Canadian firms listed in two foreign markets, 2 Canadian firms listed in three foreign markets and 1 
Canadian firm listed in four foreign markets. 
 
 
Number of Foreign listing 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Total 
number of 
firms 
Total 
number of 
foreign 
listing 
1 Argentina 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 9 
2 Australia 10 5 6 0 0 0 0 0 21 38 
3 Austria 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 5 14 
4 Belgium 0 3 2 0 1 1 0 0 7 23 
5 Brazil 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 6 11 
6 Canada 12 13 2 1 0 0 0 0 28 48 
7 Chile 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 
8 China 2 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 8 19 
9 Denmark 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 4 12 
10 Finland 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 7 
11 France 4 2 4 5 3 7 2 1 28 119 
12 Germany 3 0 3 1 3 3 2 2 17 79 
13 Greece 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 
14 India 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 
15 Indonesia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
16 Ireland 13 2 7 3 0 0 0 0 25 50 
17 Italia 4 2 2 3 1 0 0 0 12 31 
18 Japan 10 2 4 4 1 0 0 0 21 47 
19 Luxembourg 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 4 19 
20 Mexico 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
21 Netherlands 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 0 11 43 
22 New Zealand 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 10 25 
23 Norway 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 10 
24 Singapore 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 
25 South Africa 5 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 11 22 
26 South Korea 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 9 
27 Spain 2 3 2 1 1 0 1 1 11 38 
28 Sweden 2 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 8 20 
29 Switzerland 1 4 11 1 0 0 0 0 17 46 
30 Taiwan 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 9 
31 Turkey 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
32 UK 5 5 9 4 3 1 0 0 27 79 
33 US 1 4 8 4 2 0 0 0 19 59 
 Total  87 75 90 38 17 15 7 4 333 915 
 Total: EA Region 42 32 55 27 14 15 7 4 
 % of Total: EA Region 48.3 42.7 61.1 71 82.4 100 100 100 
 Total: American Region 22 23 12 5 2 0 0 0 
 % of Total: American 
Region 
25.3 30.6 13.3 13.2 11.8 0 0 0  
 Total: Asian Region 13 8 10 5 1 0 0 0  
 % du Total: Asian Region 14.9 10.6 11.1 13.2 5.9 0 0 0  
 Total: Australasia 10 10 11 0 0 0 0 0  
 % of Total: Australasia 11.5 13.3 12.2 0 0 0 0 0  
 Total: Developed country 68 49 71 33 17 14 7 4  
 % of Total: developed 
country 
78.2 65.3 78.9 86.8 100 93.3 100 100  
 Total: Emerging country 19 26 19 5 0 1 0 0  
 % of Total: Emerging 
country 
21.8 34.6 21.1 13.2 0 6.7 0 0  
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5.1.2. VARIABLE MEASURES: 
 
We construct proxies for the characteristics of the home and the foreign market, as well as for the cross listed 
firms, for the following competing hypotheses discussed in Section 2. Following Sarkissian and Schill (2004), we 
use the correlation between the stock market returns of the home and foreign countries as proxy for the market 
segmentation hypothesis. The market segmentation hypothesis discussed in Section 2 predicts a negative 
relationship between this variable and the decision to cross list in additional foreign market. 
 
To test liquidity hypothesis, we use an exogenous variable that measures market liquidity. This latter is measured 
by the number of shares traded of the home, or foreign, market index. According to the liquidity hypothesis 
discussed in section 2, we expect a negative (positive) relationship between the decision to cross list in additional 
foreign market and home market liquidity (the difference in liquidity between the destination and the home market). 
For firms from emerging countries, we do not expect any significant effect of liquidity variable on the decision to 
cross list in additional foreign markets. 
 
 We measure information disclosure with the accounting standards index of La Porta et al.(1998).This index 
measures the level of information disclosure, and so can evaluates the quality of information environment in a 
country. According to the information disclosure hypothesis, we expect a negative (positive) relationship between 
the decision to cross list in additional foreign market and home market accounting standards (the difference in 
accounting standards between the destination and the home market). As a legal measure, we take the anti-director 
rights index of La Porta et al.(1998) as a measure of investor protection. Their index varies between one and six, and 
a higher value of this index indicates a greater protection for minority shareholders. We also use the rule of law 
index from Djankov et al.(2008) and LaPorta et al.(1998). This index reveals the degree of enforcement of investor 
protection laws. A higher value of this index corresponds to more strict compliance to the rule of law. According to 
the investor protection hypothesis, we expect a negative (positive) relationship between the decision to cross list in 
additional foreign market and home market legal measure (the difference in legal measure between the destination 
and the home market). 
 
To test the proximity preference hypothesis, we use the following exogenous variables: 1/«Geography»:  Is a 
dummy variable equals 1 if the home and the host country are in same region and equals 0 otherwise. In this work 
we consider 4 regions: European and African region, American region, Australasia, and Asian region. 2/«Culture»:  
Is a dummy variable equals 1 if the home country shares a common language with host country and equals 0 
otherwise. According to the proximity preference hypothesis we predict a positive relationship between these 
variables and the decision of additional foreign listing.  
To test the Business strategy hypothesis, we use the following exogenous variables: 1/«Industry»:  Is a dummy 
variable equals 1 if the firms produce internationally traded goods and equals 0 otherwise.  According to Sarkissian 
and Schill (2004), there are eight tradable industries: chemicals, consumer goods, electronics, manufacturing, health 
care, mining, oil and gas, and paper. There are also eight non tradable industries: construction, financials, leisure, 
retail, support services, telecommunications, transportations and utilities. 2/«Subsidiary»: Is a dummy variable 
equals 1 if the firm has a subsidiary abroad and equals 0 otherwise. According to the business strategy hypothesis 
we predict a positive relationship between these variables and the decision of additional foreign listing.  
To test the growth opportunities and capital rising hypothesis, we use the following exogenous variable: «PER»: 
Is the Price-to-Earnings ratio for the year preceding cross listing. And we expect a positive relationship between this 
variable and the decision of additional foreign listing. 
Saudagaran (1988) suggest that the relative size of the firm in his local market affect significantly the decision to 
cross list. Empirically, Doidge et al (2009), Pagano et al (2002), and You et al (2013) show that firms with better 
quality are more likely to cross list. Furthermore, Pagano et al (2001) and Sarkissian and Schill (2004) show that 
firms are more likely to cross list in markets which are larger and highly capitalized. We then control for the home 
market size and firm performance. We use respectively the following variables: 1/«LogCap»: Is the natural 
logarithm of the home market capitalization for the year preceding cross listing. 2/«ROA»: Is the Return on Assets 
for the year preceding cross listing. 
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5.2. Determinants Of The Decision Of Multiple Foreign Listing:  
 
Before analyzing the determinants of multiple foreign listing, we use the Schoenfeld (1982) residuals test to 
examine whether the proportional hazard assumption of the Cox model is not violated. As can be seen in table 3, the 
variables measuring market returns correlation and accounting standards; market returns correlation and ROA; 
market returns correlation; for respectively the full sample; subset of firms from developed countries; subset of firms 
from emerging countries; violate the proportional hazard assumption. 
 
Table 3 : 
This table reports results of the Schoenfeld test of the proportional hazard assumption. 
Correlation is the correlation of the host and home market monthly index returns 2 years before cross listing. Liquidity is home market 
liquidity measured as the number of shares traded of the market index for the year preceding cross listing. Accounting standard is the 
home accounting standard index from LaPorta et al. (1998). Legal is home anti-director*home Rule of Law from LaPorta et al. (1998) and 
Djankov et al.(2008). Geography is a dummy variable=1 if the home and the host country are in same region; =0 otherwise. In this work 
we consider 4 regions: European and African region, American region, Australasia, and Asian region. Culture is a dummy variable=1 if the 
home country share a common language with host country; =0 otherwise. Industry is a dummy variable =1 if the firms produce 
internationally traded goods; =0 otherwise. There are eight tradable industries: chemicals, consumer goods, electronics, manufacturing, 
health care, mining, oil and gas, and paper. There are also eight non tradable industries: construction, financials, leisure, retail, support 
services, telecommunications, transportations and utilities. Subsidiary is a dummy variable = 1 if the firm have a subsidiary abroad; =0 
otherwise. PER is the Price-to-Earnings Ratio for the year preceding cross listing. ROA is the Return On Assets for the year preceding 
cross listing. LogCap is the natural logarithm of the home market capitalization for the year preceding cross listing. A variable is assumed 
to violate the proportional hazard assumption if p-value<0.1. 
All Developed Emerging 
ρ Chi-squared p-value ρ Chi-squared p-value ρ Chi-squared p-value 
Variable 
Correlation -0.19 32 0 -0.21 32.3 0 -0.21 6.7 0.01 
Liquidity -0.03 0.79 0.4 -0.04 0.63 0.4 0.08 1.08 0.3 
Accounting standards 0.06 3.52 0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.8 0.04 0.22 0.6 
Legal -0.02 0.47 0.5 0.02 0.44 0.5 -0.03 0.12 0.7 
Geography 0.03 0.98 0.3 0.04 1.5 0.22 0.03 0.17 0.7 
Culture -0.01 0.2 0.7 -0.02 0.35 0.56 0.01 0 0.9 
Industry 0.01 0.12 0.7 -0.006 0.02 0.9 0.05 0.18 0.7 
Subsidiary 0.01 0.31 0.6 0.01 0.06 0.8 
PER -0.01 0.02 0.9 -0.01 0.02 0.9 -0.11 0.83 0.4 
ROA 0.05 2.1 0.14 0.1 4.34 0.04 -0.03 0.1 0.8 
LogCap 0.01 0.02 0.9 -0.06 2.32 0.13 0.08 0.64 0.4 
 
One of the well-known and accepted estimation approaches for dealing with suspected non- proportionality is the 
addition of an interaction between the covariate and a function of time. If the interaction term is significant, 
therefore, the violation of the proportional hazard assumption is corrected; and if the interaction term is not 
significant, the effect of the variable is time independent and there is no reason to reject the proportional hazard 
assumption (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001). Therefore, the variables mentioned above, which violate the 
assumption are interacted with the log of time. Table 4 reports the estimation results of the PWP model. We use the 
coefficients in exponentiated form that can be interpreted as the effect of a unit change in the explanatory variable 
on the baseline hazard. For example, an exponentiated coefficient of 1.2 (0.8) implies that a one unit increase 
(decrease) in the explanatory variable increases (decreases) the probability of additional foreign listing by 20% 
relative to the baseline hazard.  
The first model reported in table 4 includes all firms in our sample. The next two models focus only on cross 
listed firms from developed country and those from emerging economies. The first row contains all variables 
included in the analysis; whereas, the second row contains those variables that violate the proportional hazard 
assumption interacted with the log time. The first row indicates the nature of the relationship between the 
independent variable and the cross listing event; whereas, the second row shows how that relationship changes over 
time. For example, if the hazard ratio for a variable in the first row is 1.2 (0.8), and in the second row is 0.8(1.2) and 
significant, this means that the effect of the independent variable is positive (negative) but it decays (increases) over 
time and becomes negative (positive). 
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Table 4 : 
 
This table reports the estimation results of the PWP model witch estimate the probability of listing in foreign market in year t, given that 
the firm does not yet have a listing of that order. Correlation is the correlation of the host and home market monthly index returns 2 year 
before cross listing. Liquidity is the home market liquidity measured as the number of shares traded of the market index for the year 
preceding cross listing. Accounting standard is the home accounting standard index from LaPorta et al.(1998). Legal is home anti-
director*home Rule of Law from LaPorta et al.(1998) and Djankov et al.(2008). Geography is a dummy variable=1 if the home and the 
host country are in same region; =0 otherwise. In this work we consider 4 regions: European and African region, American region, 
Australasia, and Asian region. Culture is a dummy variable=1 if the home country share a common language with host country; =0 
otherwise. Industry is a dummy variable =1 if the firms produce internationally traded goods; =0 otherwise. There are eight tradable 
industries: chemicals, consumer goods, electronics, manufacturing, health care, mining, oil and gas, and paper. There are also eight non 
tradable industries: construction, financials, leisure, retail, support services, telecommunications, transportations and utilities. Subsidiary 
is a dummy variable = 1 if the firm have a subsidiary abroad; =0 otherwise. PER is the Price-to-Earnings Ratio for the year preceding 
cross listing. ROA is the Return On Assets for the year preceding cross listing. LogCap is the natural logarithm of the home market 
capitalization for the year preceding cross listing. The table report hazard ratio (i.e. exp (β) not β). The t-statistics, in parentheses, test the 
null hypothesis that the hazard ratio is equal to one. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 Model 1: All firms Model 2: Developed Model 3: Emerging 
Correlation 
 
0.78 
-(1.4) 
0.81 
-(0.87) 
0.71 
-(0.42) 
Liquidity 
 
1 
-(2.97)*** 
1 
-(3.1)*** 
1 
-(1.66)* 
Accounting standard 
 
1 
-(0.91) 
1 
-(0.14) 
1 
-(0.51) 
Legal 
 
1.08 
(2.31)** 
1.01 
(2.26)** 
1.007 
(1.03) 
Geography 
 
1.35 
(4.16)*** 
1.34 
(3.74)*** 
1.08 
(0.23) 
Culture 
 
1.01 
(0.13) 
1.005 
(0.06) 
0.76 
-(1.2) 
Industry 
 
1.13 
(1.9)* 
1.1 
(1.46) 
1.28 
(1.34) 
Subsidiary 
 
1.32 
(1.76)* 
1.3 
(1.58)  
PER 
 
1.0001 
(8.73)*** 
1.001 
(3.77)*** 
1.00001 
(1.13) 
ROA 
 
1.003 
(0.94) 
1 
-(3.52)*** 
1.03 
(2.27)** 
LogCap 0.92 
-(2.48)** 
0.9 
-(2.23)** 
0.95 
-(0.95) 
Correlation 
 
0.74 
-(5.7)*** 
0.73 
-(5.38)*** 
0.64 
-(3.53)*** 
Accounting standard 
 
1.003 
(2)**   
ROA  1.002 (4)***  
Number of failures 915 812 103 
Number of observations 915 812 103 
Log likelihood -3831.2 -3270.4 -248.4 
χ2 286.83 149.4 117.2 
Prob> χ2 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
From table 4, we observe that the hazard ratio of the variable measuring the degree of integration between the 
home and the host listing market is below 1 in all the models estimated. This suggests that, if there is any effect of 
integration on the decision of multiple foreign listing, it is a negative effect. However, the hazard ratio for the 
variable “correlation” is statistically insignificant at any conventional level, although the interaction term with time 
is significant and below 1 for all the models. This shows that the effect of the level of integration on the decision of 
additional foreign listing varies over time and is still negative. These results lead us to accept hypothesis H1. Our 
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findings are congruent with Abdallah and Ioannidis (2010), Doukas and Switzer (2000) and Miller (1999), who 
associate the change in stock prices around cross listing and the reduction of cost of capital with a market 
segmentation consideration. Table 4 also shows a lower coefficient of hazard ratio for the variable “correlation” in 
model 3. Firms from emerging markets are more likely to cross list in countries having a higher degree of 
segmentation with their local countries. This result leads us to accept the hypothesis H1’, and to be in line with 
Miller (1999) and Serra (1999) who find that firms from emerging country benefit more from cross listing due to the 
high level of segmentation. Regarding the variable related to the geographic proximity, the hazard ratio is above 1 
and significant for the first two models.  This result leads us to conclude that firms prefer to list in additional foreign 
countries that are geographically closer to their home countries and offer an empirical evidence for the geographic 
proximity hypothesis. This is in line with the results of Sarkissian and Shill (2004, 2009). For the subset of firms 
from emerging markets, we observe an even preference for listing in additional proximate market (in geographic 
terms). The coefficient on the hazard ratio is above 1. However, it is no longer statistically significant due, probably, 
to a smaller sample size. Regarding the variable related to cultural proximity, the coefficient of the hazard ratio of 
the variable “culture” is not significant for all the models estimated. These results lead us to reject the hypothesis 
H5b, and to assert that firms have no preference for additional listing in proximate market (in cultural terms). This 
result may be due to the correlation between cultural proximity and market correlation. As pointed out by Sarkissian 
and Shill (2004), if neighboring markets produce correlated market returns, the market correlation variable proxies, 
in our case, sharing of common language. This means that this result offers another empirical evidence for the 
segmentation hypothesis. Concerning the variables related to the global strategy hypothesis, “industry” and 
“subsidiary”, estimation results of model 1 in table 4 show that, the coefficients of the hazard ratio are above 1 and 
statistically significant. Firms that produce internationally traded goods and have a subsidiary abroad are more likely 
to cross list in additional foreign market. For the subsets of firms from emerging and developed countries, the 
coefficient of the hazard ratio related to the global strategy’s variables is also above 1 but not overly significant. For 
the full sample and subset of firms from developed countries, the coefficient of the hazard ratio on the “PER” is 
above 1 and is significant at a 1% level. Fast growing firms tend to make additional foreign listing. These results 
lead us to accept hypothesis H7. Our findings are similar to those of You et al.(2013) who find that firms list in 
additional foreign country to take advantage of higher valuation to raise capital more cheaply. For the subset of 
firms from emerging country, the coefficient on the “PER” variable is also above 1 but not so significant. This result 
does not support hypothesis H7 for subset of firms from emerging countries, and can be explained by the smaller 
sample size. From table 4, we can observe that the coefficient on the liquidity variable is equal to 1 and significant 
in the three estimated models. This suggests that local market liquidity plays no role in the decision of additional 
foreign listing. This result leads us to reject hypothesis H2 and accept H2’. Such a finding contradicts those of 
Domowitz et al.(1998) and Foerster and Karolyi (1998).Overall, the quality of the local accounting standard seems 
to have no effect on the decision made by firms to list in multiple foreign markets. Thus, we reject hypotheses H3 
and H3’. Our results are not in harmony with those of Lang et al.(2003) and Lee and Valero (2010) who maintain 
that cross listing in the US is associated with an enhancement in the informational environment. Moreover, we also 
confirm a significant and positive relationship between the decision for multiple foreign listing and the home 
country’s investor protection level for the total sample and for the subset of firms from developed countries. These 
results are similar to those of You et al (2013) who find that additional foreign listing decision is positively related 
to home country’s investor protection level, and Roosenboom and VanDijk (2009) who assert that cross listing 
premium is positively related to the home country’s investor protection level for stocks cross listed in continental 
European countries. For the subset of firms from emerging markets, the coefficient on the legal variable is above 1. 
This suggests that if there is any effect of the home country’s investor protection level, it is a positive one. However, 
the hazard ratio for the variable “legal” is statistically insignificant. Thus, we do not empirically support the bonding 
hypothesis for firms from emerging countries. Our findings are not in line with those of Doidge (2004), Doidge et 
al.(2007) and Reese and Weisbach (2002), who find empirical support for the bonding hypothesis for firms cross 
listed in the US. Table 4 shows that, an additional listing decision appears to be significantly influenced by the home 
country’s market capitalization and firm performance. For firms from developed countries, those with better quality 
and coming from markets with lower capitalization are more likely to list in additional foreign markets. For the 
subset of firms from emerging markets, those with better quality are more likely to list in multiple foreign markets. 
Our results against the bonding hypothesis, the information disclosure hypothesis and the liquidity hypothesis 
contradict a considerable body of literature examining the motives and benefits of cross listing (Doidge, 2004; 
Doidge et al. 2007; Domowitz et al. 1998; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998; Lang et al. 2003; Lee and Valero, 2010; 
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Reese and Weisbach, 2002). The main reason for this difference is that previous studies focus on cross listing in the 
US market; whereas we focus on listing in different countries in the world. The US is a relatively highly developed 
country in terms of the level of investor protection, liquidity and accounting standard, which may attract foreign 
firms seeking better investor protection, better liquidity and better informational environment than their home 
country. Thus, we rerun the regression by controlling the characteristics of the foreign listing market relating to 
liquidity consideration, information and legal environment. We report the results of the test of the proportional 
hazard assumption on table 5.  
 
Table 5: 
 
This table report results of the Schoenfeld test of the proportional hazard assumption. 
Correlation is the correlation of the host and home market monthly index returns 2 year before cross listing. Liquidity is the host 
market liquidity to home market liquidity ratio. Liquidity market is measured as the number of shares traded of the market index 
for the year preceding cross listing. Accounting standard is a dummy variable equals 1 if the host accounting standard index is 
superior to home accounting standard, and equals 0 otherwise. Legal is a dummy variable =1 if host legal regime is better than 
home legal regime; =0 otherwise.  Legal regime is measured by anti-director*Rule of Law from LaPorta et al.(1998) and Djankov 
et al.(2008). Geography is a dummy variable=1 if the home and the host country are in same region; =0 otherwise. In this work we 
consider 4 regions: European and African region, American region, Australasia, and Asian region. Culture is a dummy variable=1 
if the home country share a common language with host country; =0 otherwise. Industry is a dummy variable =1 if the firms 
produce internationally traded goods; =0 otherwise. There are eight tradable industries: chemicals, consumer goods, electronics, 
manufacturing, health care, mining, oil and gas, and paper. There are also eight non tradable industries: construction, financials, 
leisure, retail, support services, telecommunications, transportations and utilities. Subsidiary is a dummy variable = 1 if the firm 
have a subsidiary abroad; =0 otherwise. PER is the Price-to-Earnings Ratio for the year preceding cross listing. ROA is the Return 
On Assets for the year proceeding cross listing. LogCap is the natural logarithm of the home market capitalization for the year 
proceeding cross listing 
A variable is assumed to violate the proportional hazard assumption if p-value<0.1. 
All Developed Emerging 
ρ Chi-squared p-value ρ Chi-squared p-value ρ Chi-squared p-value 
Variable 
Correlation -0.18 31.4 0.000 -0.21 34.2 0.000 -0.14 3.9 0.046 
Liquidity -0.15 94.9 0.000 -0.13 58.6 0.000 -0.19 7.7 0.005 
Accounting 
standards 0.088 8.8 0.003 0.1 10.2 0.001 0.07 1.11 0.29 
Legal 0.027 1.33 0.24 0.009 0.12 0.73 0.09 1.47 0.22 
Geography 0.1 11.3 0.008 0.067 3.6 0.05 0.05 0.32 0.57 
Culture 0.067 4.8 0.028 0.004 0.01 0.9 0.2 7.6 0.005 
Industry -0.05 3.17 0.075 -0.07 4.9 0.025 0.11 1.81 0.17 
Subsidiary 0.018 0.38 0.53 0.005 0.03 0.85 - - - 
PER -0.17 22.2 0.000 0.1 5.26 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.72 
ROA 0.11 15.6 0.0001 0.1 10.3 0.001 -0.08 0.69 0.4 
LogCap 0.007 0.05 0.83 -0.05 2.63 0.1 0.06 0.42 0.51 
 
 
 
Table 5 shows that the hypothesis is violated for the following variables: « Correlation », « Liquidity », 
« Accounting standard », « Geography », « Culture », « Industry », « PER » and « ROA » for full 
sample;« Correlation », « Liquidity », « Accounting standard », « Geography », « Industry», « PER » and 
« ROA » for subset of firms from developed countries; « Correlation », « Liquidity » and « Culture » for subset of 
firms from emerging countries. Therefore, these variables are interacted with log time when estimating the PWP 
model. The results are reported in table 6. 
Table 6 shows that all interaction terms are significant except for the following variables: « Culture » and 
« Industry » for full sample. «Industry» and « PER » for subset of firms from developed countries. So, there is no 
reason to reject the proportional hazard hypothesis for these latter variables, and consequently, there is no reason to 
interact them with a function of time. Our final results about the estimation of the PWP model are reported in table 
7. 
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Table 6 
 
This table reports the estimation results of the PWP model which estimate the probability of listing in foreign market in year t, 
given that the firm does not yet have a listing of that order. Correlation is the correlation of the host and home market monthly 
index returns 2 year before cross listing. Liquidity is the host market liquidity to home market liquidity ratio. Liquidity market is 
measured as the number of shares traded of the market index for the year preceding cross listing. Accounting standard is a dummy 
variable equals 1 if the host accounting standard index is superior to home accounting standard, and equals 0 otherwise. Legal is a 
dummy variable =1 if host legal regime is better than home legal regime; =0 otherwise.  Legal regime is measured by anti-
director*Rule of Law from LaPorta et al.(1998) and Djankov et al.(2008). Geography is a dummy variable=1 if the home and the 
host country are in same region; =0 otherwise. In this work we consider 4 regions: European and African region, American region, 
Australasia, and Asian region. Culture is a dummy variable=1 if the home country share a common language with host country; =0 
otherwise. Industry is a dummy variable =1 if the firms produce internationally traded goods; =0 otherwise. There are eight 
tradable industries: chemicals, consumer goods, electronics, manufacturing, health care, mining, oil and gas, and paper. There are 
also eight non tradable industries: construction, financials, leisure, retail, support services, telecommunications, transportations and 
utilities. Subsidiary is a dummy variable = 1 if the firm have a subsidiary abroad; =0 otherwise. PER is the Price-to-Earnings 
Ratio for the year preceding cross listing. ROA is the Return On Assets for the year proceeding cross listing. LogCap is the natural 
logarithm of the home market capitalization for the year proceeding cross listing. The table report hazard ratio (i.e. exp (β) not β). 
The t-statistics, in parentheses, test the null hypothesis that the hazard ratio is equal to one. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 Model 1: All firms Model 2: Developed Model 3: Emerging  
Correlation 
 
0.78 
(-1.02) 
0.83 
(-0.71) 
0.51 
(-0.65) 
Liquidity 
 
1.005 
(5.23)*** 
1.06 
(5.41)*** 
1.002 
(-0.57) 
Accounting standard 
 
0.82 
(-1.8)* 
0.8 
(-2.05)** 
1.48 
 (0.81) 
Legal 
 
0.95 
(-0.71) 
0.94 
(-0.63) 
1.05 
(0.17) 
Geography 
 
1.13 
(1.21) 
1.1 
(0.98) 
1.4 
(1.22) 
Culture 
 
1.07 
(0.61) 
1.09 
(1.14) 
0.45 
(-2.16)** 
Industry 
 
1.1 
(1) 
1.1 
(0.97) 
1.4 
(1.47) 
Subsidiary 
 
1.36 
(1.93)* 
1.35 
(1.92)*  
PER 
 
1.001 
(4.41)*** 
1.001 
(4.55)*** 
1.00002 
(1.78)* 
ROA 
 
1 
(-2)** 
1 
(-2.46)** 
1.04 
(3.27)*** 
    
LogCap 0.92 
(-2.53)*** 
0.9 
(-2.43)** 
0.96 
(-0.67) 
Correlation 
 
0.74 
(-5.4)*** 
0.72 
(-5.64)*** 
0.69 
(-2.54)** 
Liquidity 1 
(2.33)*** 
1 
(-6.03)*** 
1 
(-2.95)*** 
Accounting standard 
 
1.16 
(2.33)** 
1.16 
(2.23)**  
Geography 1.05 
(2.03)** 
1.05 
(2.08)**  
Culture 
 
1.02 
(0.74)  
1.21 
(2.94)*** 
Industry 
 
1.01 
(0.52) 
0.99 
(-0.05)  
PER 1 
(-4.2)*** 
0.99 
(-0.02)  
ROA 1.002 
(3.56)*** 
1.002 
(3.5)***  
Number of failures 915 812 103 
Number of observations 915 812 103 
Log Likelihood -3814.1 -3259.1 -243.8 
χ2 536.7 295.2 123.6 
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Prob> χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
From table 7, we reach the same conclusion for the variables related to market correlation, geographic proximity, 
 
Table 7: 
This table reports the estimation results of the PWP model witch estimate the probability of listing in foreign market in year t, given 
that the firm does not yet have a listing of that order. Correlation is the correlation of the host and home market monthly index returns 
2 year before cross listing. Liquidity is the host market liquidity to home market liquidity ratio. Liquidity market is measured as the 
number of shares traded of the market index for the year preceding cross listing. Accounting standard is a dummy variable equals 1 if 
the host accounting standard index is superior to home accounting standard, and equals 0 otherwise. Legal is a dummy variable =1 if 
host legal regime is better than home legal regime; =0 otherwise.  Legal regime is measured by anti-director*Rule of Law from LaPorta 
et al.(1998) and Djankov et al.(2008). Geography is a dummy variable=1 if the home and the host country are in same region; =0 
otherwise. In this work we consider 4 regions: European and African region, American region, Australasia, and Asian region. Culture 
is a dummy variable=1 if the home country share a common language with host country; =0 otherwise. Industry is a dummy variable 
=1 if the firms produce internationally traded goods; =0 otherwise. There are eight tradable industries: chemicals, consumer goods, 
electronics, manufacturing, health care, mining, oil and gas, and paper. There are also eight non tradable industries: construction, 
financials, leisure, retail, support services, telecommunications, transportations and utilities. Subsidiary is a dummy variable = 1 if the 
firm have a subsidiary abroad; =0 otherwise. PER is the Price-to-Earnings Ratio for the year preceding cross listing. ROA is the Return 
On Assets for the year proceeding cross listing. LogCap is the natural logarithm of the home market capitalization for the year 
proceeding cross listing. The table report hazard ratio (i.e. exp (β) not β). The t-statistics, in parentheses, test the null hypothesis that the 
hazard ratio is equal to one. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 Model 1: All firms Model 2: Developed Model 3: Emerging 
Correlation 
 
0.76 
(-1.14) 
0.83 
(-0.71) 
0.51 
(-0.65) 
Liquidity 
 
1.005 
(5.82)*** 
1.01 
(5.4)*** 
1.002 
(-0.57) 
Accounting standard 
 
0.82 
(-1.84)* 
0.8 
(-2.05)** 
1.48 
 (0.81) 
Legal 
 
0.94 
(-0.73) 
0.94 
(-0.7) 
1.05 
(0.17) 
Geography 
 
1.13 
(1.23) 
1.11 
(0.98) 
1.4 
(1.22) 
Culture 
 
1.14 
(1.74)* 
1.1 
(1.13) 
0.45 
(-2.16)** 
Industry 
 
1.14 
(2.07)** 
1.1 
(1.4) 
1.4 
(1.47) 
Subsidiary 
 
1.34 
(1.83)* 
1.35 
(1.93)*  
PER 
 
1.001 
(4.46)*** 
1.001 
(2.78)*** 
1.00002 
(1.78)* 
ROA 
 
1 
(-2)** 
1 
(-2.47)** 
1.04 
(3.27)*** 
LogCap 0.92 
(-2.59)*** 
0.9 
(-2.43)** 
0.96 
(-0.67) 
Correlation 
 
0.74 
(-5.4)*** 
0.72 
(-5.65)*** 
0.69 
(-2.54)** 
Liquidity 1 
(-8.27)*** 
1 
(-6.04)*** 
1 
(-2.95)*** 
Accounting standard 
 
1.16 
(2.33)** 
1.16 
(2.23)**  
Geography 1.05 
(2.06)** 
1.05 
(2.07)**  
Culture 
   
1.21 
(2.94)*** 
PER 1 
(-4.2)***   
ROA 1.002 
(3.57)*** 
1.002 
(3.52)***  
Number of failures 915 812 103 
Number of observations 915 812 103 
Log likrlihood -3814.1 -3259.1 -243.8 
χ2 516.1 286.8 123.6 
Prob> χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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firm’s global strategy, growth opportunities and quality of the firm as well as local market capitalization. We also 
keep the same conclusions about the role of cultural proximity in the decision of additional foreign listing for the 
subset of firms from developed countries. However, the hazard ratio for the variable «Culture» is above 1 and 
significant in model 1. For firms from emerging markets, the related coefficient is also significant and cultural 
proximity seems to play a role in the decision of multiple listing for firms originating from emerging markets. While 
the main effect of «Culture» variable is negative (hazard ratio=0.45), this effect grows over time and becomes 
positive (hazard ratio=1.21). This result leads us to accept hypothesis H5a for firms from emerging markets. Our 
first finding related to the main effect of cultural proximity on the decision made by firms from emerging countries 
to list their shares in additional foreign markets is in line with that of Dodd et al.(2013) who finds that firms from 
some emerging markets (Greece and Portugal) seek culturally disparate countries to list in. The evolution of this 
effect over time and the newly created positive effect of culture proximity on the decision for additional foreign 
listing may be interpreted by the fact that firms have become more aware about the benefit of listing in closely 
related foreign country in term of culture. As argued by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), investors are more likely to 
trade stocks of firms that share the investor’s same language and cultural background. Regarding the liquidity 
variable, models 1 and 2 show that the main effect of the variable «liquidity» is positive and significant. While this 
effect varies over time, it does not become negative. In other words, these firms may list in additional foreign 
markets to benefit from better liquidity. We can thus accept hypothesis H2.For the subset of firms from emerging 
markets, liquidity plays no role in the decision of multiple foreign listing. This result leads us to accept hypothesis 
H2’.Our results are in accordance with the findings in earlier literature which show that cross listing enhances 
liquidity, especially for firms from developed countries (Bacidore et al. 2005; Domowitz et al. 1998; Silva and 
Chavez, 2008;Smith and Sofianos, 1997).  
Turning to the variable measuring the quality of the informational environment, table 7 shows the same results 
for all sample and subsets of firms from developed countries. The effect of the variable measuring the quality of the 
information disclosure of the listing countries compared to that of the home countries grows in time and becomes 
positive. These results show that firms have become more aware of the benefits of cross listing related to an 
enhancement of the informational environment which motivates them to list in additional foreign markets with 
better accounting standard. These results lead us to accept hypothesis H3.For the subset of firms from emerging 
markets, the coefficient on the variable accounting standard is not significant. The quality of the country’s 
accounting standard plays no role in the decision of multiple listing for firms from emerging countries. Based on 
these results, we reject hypothesis H3’. We also spot no significant relationship between the level of the country’s 
investor protection and the decision for additional foreign listing. Investor protection plays no role in the decision of 
multiple foreign listing, and we reject, therefore, hypotheses H4 and H4’.Even after taking into account listing 
market characteristics, we again reject the bonding hypothesis and show the absence of a correlation between the 
level of investor protection and multiple listing decision. These results can be explained by two reasons. First, as 
pointed out by Doidge et al.(2009), for firms from countries with weak investor protection, dominant shareholders 
may expropriate firm value at the expense of minority shareholders, and are, therefore, less likely to seek a listing in 
a country with better investor protection. Corporate managers may go abroad if the benefit associated with cross 
listing exceeds its costs which stem from additional investor protection granted their minority shareholders that 
make it harder for them to extract private benefit of control. Second, the difference in our results with those of 
earlier literature who find an empirical support of the bonding hypothesis may also be explained by the fact that 
previous studies use only a single listing country while we focus on the average effect of a covariate on the 
recurrence of foreign listing event.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
With the increased number of firms seeking foreign listing, a substantial body of literature has emerged to study 
the motivations of cross listing. While a considerable proportion of cross listed firms choose to list in multiple 
foreign markets, earlier literature focused on cross listing on the US. In this paper, we aim to investigate the 
motivations of the decision of additional foreign listing by using a set of 333 companies with 915 foreign listing in 
19 countries. We study the reasons of multiple listing based on both country and firm-specific characteristics and we 
provide empirical evidence against the bonding hypothesis. Bonding hypothesis can explain cross listing in the US, 
while multiple foreign listing is related to reasons other than committing to a higher level of investor protection. We 
find that firms from developed countries and coming from markets with lower capitalization are more likely to list 
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their shares in additional foreign markets. We also find that market segmentation hypothesis, information 
considerations and geographic proximity between home and host countries play a growing important effect over 
time on the decision made by firms from developed markets to list in additional foreign markets. Firms from 
developed countries may also choose to list in additional foreign market with better liquidity and where they have a 
subsidiary. For firms from emerging countries, we provide empirical evidence for the segmentation hypothesis. 
Country factors, such as liquidity and accounting standard play no role in explaining multiple foreign listing. 
However, culture proximity significantly affects the decision of additional foreign listing for firms from emerging 
countries. This latter effect becomes more positive over time because firms have become more aware about the 
benefit of listing in proximate country in term of culture. The finding of this research has important implications for 
various groups of market participants. First, understanding the motivations of additional foreign listing and their 
evolution over time is important for companies wishing a foreign listing of their shares. Second, the findings of this 
paper help financial markets identify the factors that make them competitive in attracting foreign companies. While 
this work investigates various reasons for the decision of multiple listing, we limit the sample size to 333 firms. 
Future research can provide further empirical evidence on the motivations of multiple listing by using a larger 
sample. 
 
References 
 
Abdallah, A. A., Ioannidis, C., (2010). Why Do Firms Cross-List? International Evidence from the US Market.Quarterly Review of Economics 
and Finance 50, 202-213.  
Abdallah, A. A., Abdallah, W., Saad, M., (2011). The Effect of Cross-listing on Trading Volume: Reducing Segmentation versus Signaling 
Investor Protection. Journal of Financial Research 34, 589-616.  
Alexander, G. J., Eun, C. S.,  Janakiramanan, S., (1987). Asset Pricing and Dual Listing on Foreign Capital Markets: A Note. Journal of Finance 
42, 151-158.  
Amihud, Y.,  Mendelson, H., (1986). Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread. Journal of Financial Economics 17, 223-249.  
Amira, K.,  Muzere, M. L., (2011). Competition among Stock Exchanges for Equity.Journal of Banking and Finance 35, 2355-2373. 
Andersen, P.K., Gill, R. D., (1982).  Cox's regression model for counting processes: a large sample study. Annals of Statistics 10, 1100-1120. 
Bacidore, J., Battalio, R., Galpin, N.,  Jennings, R., (2005). Sources of liquidity for NYSE- listed non-U.S. stocks. Journal of Banking and 
Finance 29, 3075-3098. 
Bailey, W., Karolyi, G. A., Salva, C., (2006). The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure: Evidence from International Cross-Listings. 
Journal of Financial Economics 81, 175-213.  
Bancel, F.,  Mittoo, U. R., (2001). European Managerial Perceptions of the Net Benefits of Foreign Stock Listings.European Financial 
Management 7, 213-236.  
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C.R., Lundblad, C.T., Siegel, S., (2011). What Segments Equity Markets?. Review of Financial Studies 24,  3841-3890. 
Box-Steffensmeier, J.M., Zorn, C.J.W., (2001). Duration Models and Proportional Hazards in  Political Science. American Journal of Political 
Science 45, 972-988. 
Brennan, M. J.,  Subrahmanyam, A., (1996). Market Microstructure and Asset Pricing: on the Compensation for Illiquidity in Stock Returns. 
Journal of Financial Economics 41, 441-464. 
Chemmanur, T. J.,  Fulghieri, P., (2006). Competition and Cooperation among Exchanges: A Theory of Cross-Listing and Endogenous Listing 
Standards. Journal of Financial Economics 82, 455-489.  
Cleves, M., (1999).Analysis of Multiple Failure Time Data with Stata.Stata Technical Bulletin 49, 30-39. 
Coffee, J. C. Jr., (1999). Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications. Northwestern 
University Law Review 93, 641-708.  
Coffee, J. C. Jr., (2002).Racing Towards the Top: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate 
Governance. Columbia Law Review 102, 1757-1831.  
Cox, D. R., (1972). Regression Models and Life Table (with discussion).Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 34, 187-222. 
Djankov, S., LaPorta, R., Lopez-de-Silianes, F.,  Shleifer, A., (2008). The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing.Journal of Financial Economics 
88, 430-465. 
Dodd, O., (2013). Why do firms cross list their shares on foreign exchanges? A review of cross listing theories and empirical evidence. Review 
ofBehavioral Finance 5, 77 – 99. 
Dodd, O., Frijns, B.,  Gilbert, A., (2013). On the Role of Cultural Distance in the Decision to Cross-List.European Financial Management 20, 1–
36. 
Dodd, O.,  Louca, C., (2012). International Cross-Listing and Shareholders' Wealth.Multinational Finance Journal 16, 49-86. 
Doidge, C., (2004). U.S. Cross-Listings and the Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from Dual-Class Firms. Journal of Financial Economics 
72, 519-553.  
Doidge C., Karolyi, G.A., Stulz, R.M., (2007). Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance?.Journal of Financial Economics 86, 
1-39. 
Doidge C., Karolyi, G.A., Stulz, R.M., (2009). Has New York Become Less Competitive in Global Markets? Evaluating Foreign Listing Choice 
over Time. Journal of Financial Economics 91, 253-277.   
Domowitz, I., Glen, J., Madhavan, A., (1998). International Cross-Listing and Order Flow Migration: Evidence from an Emerging Market. 
Journal of Finance 53,  2001- 2027.  
Doukas, J., Switzer, L. N., (2000). Common Stock Returns and International Listing Announcements: Conditional Tests of the Mild 
681 Imen Ghadhab and Slaheddine Hellara /  Procedia Economics and Finance  26 ( 2015 )  663 – 681 
Segmentation Hypothesis. Journal of Banking and Finance 24, 471-501.  
Eaton, T. V., Nofsinger, J. R., Weaver, D. G., (2007). Disclosure and the Cost of Equity in International Cross-Listing.Review of Quantitative 
Finance and Accounting 29, 1- 24. 
Errunza, V., Losq, E., (1985). International Asset Pricing under Mild Segmentation: Theory and Test. Journal of Finance 40, 105-124.  
Errunza, V. R.,  Miller, D. P., (2000). Market Segmentation and the Cost of Capital in International Equity Markets.Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 35, 577-600.  
Fanto, J.,  Karmel, R., (1997). A Report on the Attitudes of Foreign Firms Regarding a US Listing.Stanford Journal of Law Business and Finance 
3, 51-75.    
Foerster, S. R., Karolyi, G. A., (1998). Multimarket Trading and Liquidity: A Transaction Data Analysis of Canada-US Inter-Listings. Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 8, 393-412.   
Foerster, S. R., Karolyi, G.A., (1999). The Effects of Market Segmentation and Investor Recognition on Asset Prices: Evidence from Foreign 
Stocks Listing in the United States. Journal of Finance 54, 981-1013. 
Fuerst, O., (1998). A Theoretical Analysis of the Investor Protection Regulations Argument for Global Listing of Stocks.Working paper, Yale 
School of Management. 
Gagnon, L.,  Karolyi, G.A., (2011).  Do international cross-listings still matter? in Evidence on Financial Globalization and Crises . Thorsten 
Beck, Sergio Schmukler and Stijn Claessens (eds.), Elsevier North Holland Publishers, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 
Grinblatt M., Keloharju, M., (2001). How distance, language, and culture influence stockholdings and trades. Journal of Finance 56, 1053-1073. 
Hail, L., Leuz, C., (2009). Cost of Capital Effects and Changes in Growth Expectations around U.S. Cross-Listings. Journal of Financial 
Economics 93, 428-454.   
Huddart, S., Hughes, J. S.,  Brunnermeier, M. K., (1999). Disclosure Requirements and Stock Exchange Listing Choice in an International 
Context. Journal of Accounting and Economics 26, 237-269.   
Jayaraman, N., Shastri, K., Tandon, K., (1993). The Impact of International Cross Listings on Risk and Return: The Evidence from American 
Depository Receipts. Journal of Banking and Finance 17, 91-103. 
Karolyi, G.A., (2006).The World of Cross-Listings and Cross-Listings of the World: Challenging Conventional Wisdom . Review of 
Finance 10, 99-152. 
Lang, M. H., Lins, K. V.,  Miller, D. P., (2003). ADRs, Analysts, and Accuracy: Does Cross-Listing in the United States Improve a Firm's 
Information Environment and Increase Market Value?. Journal of Accounting Research 41, 317-345.  
Lang, M., Lins, K. V., Maffett, M., (2012). Transparency, Liquidity, and Valuation: International Evidence on When Transparency Matters Most. 
Journal of Accounting Research 50, 729-774.  
LaPorta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.,  Vishny, R.W., 1997. Legal determinants of external finance.Journal of Finance 52, 1131-1150. 
LaPorta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.,  Vishny, R.W., 1998. Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113-1155.   
Lee, H. W., Valero, M., (2010). Cross-Listing Effect on Information Environment of Foreign Firms: ADR Type and Country Characteristics. 
Journal of Multinational Financial Management 20, 178-196.  
Lim, H.J., Liu, J.,  Melzer-Lange, M., (2007). Comparaison of Methods for Analyzing Recurrent Events Data: Application to the Emergency 
Department Visits of Pediatric Firearm Victims. Accident Analysis and Prevention 39, 290-299. 
Lins, K., Strickland, D., Zenner, M., (2005). Do non-U.S. firms issue stock on U.S. equity markets to relax capital constraints?.Journal 
ofFinancial and Quantitative Analysis 40, 109-133. 
Miller, D. P., (1999). The Market Reaction to International Cross-Listings: Evidence from Depositary Receipts. Journal of Financial Economics 
51, 103-123.  
Mittoo, U. R., (2003). Globalization and the Value of US Listing: Revisiting Canadian Evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance 27, 1629-1661.  
Pagano, M., Roell, A. A.,  Zechner, J., (2002). The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do Firms List Abroad?.Journal of Finance 57, 2651-2694. 
Pagano, M., Randl, O., Roell, A. A.,  Zechner, J., (2001). What Makes Stock Exchanges Succeed? Evidence from Cross-Listing 
Decisions.European Economic Review 45, 770-782.  
Prentice, R.L., Williams, B.J., Peterson, A.V., (1981).On the regression analysis of multivariate failure time data.Biometrica 68, 373-379. 
Reese, W. A., Weisbach, M. S., (2002). Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-Listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity 
Offerings.Journal of Financial Economics 66, 65-104.  
Roosenboom, P., Van Dijk, M. A. (2009). The Market Reaction to Cross-Listings: Does the Destination Market Matter?.Journal of Banking and 
Finance 33, 1898-1908.  
Sarkissian, S., Schill, M. J., (2004). The Overseas Listing Decision: New Evidence of Proximity Preference. Review of Financial Studies 17, 
769-809.  
Sarkissian, S.,  Schill, M. J., (2009). Are There Permanent Valuation Gains to Overseas Listing?. Review of Financial Studies 22, 371-412.  
Saudagaran, S., (1988). An empirical study of selected factors influencing the decision to list on foreign stock exchanges. Journal of International 
Business Studies 19, 101-127. 
Schoenfeld, D., (1982). Partial Residuals for the Proportional Hazards Regression Model.Biometrica 69, 239-241. 
Serra, A. P., (1999). Dual-Listings on International Exchanges: The Case of Emerging Markets Stocks. European Financial Management 5, 165-
202.  
Silva, A. C.,  Chávez, G. A., (2008). Cross-Listing and Liquidity in Emerging Market Stocks.Journal of Banking and Finance 32, 420-433.  
Smith, K.,  Sofianos, G., (1997). The Impact of a NYSE Listing on the Global Trading of Non-U.S. Stocks. NYSE Working paper 97-02.    
Stapleton, R. C., Subrahmanyam, M. G., (1977). Market Imperfections, Capital Market Equilibrium and Corporate Finance.Journal of Finance 
32,  307-319.   
Stulz, R. M., (1999). Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of Capital.Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 12, 8-25.   
Wei, L.J., Lin, D.Y., Weissfeld, L., (1989). Regression analysis of multivariate incomplete failure time data by modeling marginal 
distributions.Journal of the American Statistical Association 84, 1065-1073. 
You, L., Lucey, B.M., Shu, Y., (2013).An Empirical Study of Multiple Direct International Listings.Global Finance Journal 24, 69-84. 
 
